In 1966, The NVA Overran LZ Bird. Then The Secret Beehive Round Was Fired For The First Time.
In 1966, The NVA Overran LZ Bird. Then The Secret Beehive Round Was Fired For The First Time.

On the night of the 26th of December 1966, two North Vietnamese battalions walked to within 12 m of an American firebase and nobody heard them coming. That figure comes from the United States Army center of military history. 12 m. Close enough to hear men talking inside the wire.
A few hours later, the guns of Landing Zone Bird were in enemy hands. And the internet will tell you that what happened next was the first time America ever fired its secret beehive round. The Army’s own artillery history says otherwise. What the army does say is stranger than the myth and it makes this night matter more, not less.
Kim Sunun Valley, Ben Den province, late in 1966. The first cavalry division was running an operation called Theer 2. According to the center of military history volume written by Glenn Williams, the target was the third North Vietnamese division, the formation the Vietnamese called the Yellow Star.
Bend Den was one of the least secure provinces in South Vietnam and the Kim Sun had been enemy ground for years. On the 17th of December, American troops fought two North Vietnamese battalions in that valley. The third division commander, Colonel Latruk, was not willing to hand the ground over. Williams writes that Latruk ordered his 22nd regiment to go and take one of the divisions landing zones apart. He picked the smallest one.
Bird sat on low ground inside a bend of the Kim Sun River. From the air, it looked in one veteran description quoted by Soldier of Fortune like a t-bone stake, roughly 250 m long and 80 across. The river was supposed to be the defense. Three sides of water running high in the monsoon, and the men who flew in could see the curve of it from the helicopters.
What the river could not do was stop anyone walking in from the fourth side. The army’s official campaign volume is blunt about the state of the place. The fortifications were in poor shape after monsoon flooding. There was no protective razor wire. There were no listening posts pushed out past the bunker line, which is the one thing that catches men crawling in the dark, and there were not enough people.
Major General David Euing Au, who wrote the army’s official field artillery history of the war, records the garrison as one half strength infantry company plus 12 howitzers, six of them 105 mm and six of them 155. 12 guns and fewer than 200 men holding about five hectares of open ground. There was also a truce on both sides had agreed to stop shooting over Christmas.
Helicopters brought a hot meal in and then circled the position playing Christmas music through the loudspeakers and one of the men on bird remembered afterwards that he had liked it. Rain had soaked everyone through on Christmas day. The night that followed was pitch black under heavy cloud.
Staff Sergeant Delbert Jennings was not enjoying any of it. The Soldier of Fortune account has him sick with stomach pain and unable to sleep. Worried because his weapons platoon had 22 men to cover the northern sector and some of them were replacements who had never been in a fight. Out past the bunker line, the 22nd regiment was already moving.
One story has followed this battle for 60 years and it deserves to be said out loud and then labeled honestly. A forward observer working alongside Korean units later wrote that his team spotted a large armed group heading toward Bird 2 hours before the ceasefire took effect and that higher headquarters refused permission to engage.
That account comes from veteran recollection, not from any official record and no primary source confirms it. Treat it as what it is. At around 1 in the morning on the 27th, the mortars opened up. Mortars, heavy machine guns, and 57 millimeter recoilless rifles. All of it arriving at once on a position where half the garrison was asleep.
Williams describes the barrage as disorienting the defenders, which is precisely what it was built to do. Behind it, the lead battalion came through the northeastern corner. They did not have far to travel. Men who had spent the evening lying 12 m from the wire were inside the perimeter in seconds.
One survivor, Spencer Madison, later described watching tracer rounds come toward his position and said the images had never left him. The 155 mm pits went first. Then some of the 105 mm pits. American gunners ended up fighting with rifles and with their hands around their own howitzers. Two men from the same battery spent that night buried alive.
Their overhead cover collapsed into the foxhole on top of them and they lay under it listening to Vietnamese voices directly above feeling bayonets pushing down through the sandbags. Bird was by any reasonable use of the word being overrun. raction to where you guys would occasionally wear these or there was another uh another boot that had actually a foot pattern on the bottom.
So that came from SISO, our supply people. Yes. In Okinawan. Indeed. Ed Baker. If if you wanted Ed Baker Yes. Yeah. Yeah. So So if you actually wanted to get a uh leave like a footprint or leave um an indigenous print then then you would sometimes u Yeah.
But we never we never got to this far to us wearing them because uh one thing about the our jungle boots, we had that metal plate. So if we ever or think about stepping on something more explosive. True. You know that would protect your foot a little bit at least. And we had we given the option well we would have thought about it but who knows what the 22nd regiment had not taken was one gun.
UT’s history names the men who used it. Captain Leonard Schlinker gave the order. First Lieutenant John Piper loaded the round and pulled the lanyard. The Soldier of Fortune account adds Staff Sergeant Robert Underwood to the crew. They cranked the tube down until it was nearly level and they aimed a howitzer at a range of a few dozen meters into their own position.
The round was the M546, officially the anti-personnel tracer. Everyone called it beehive. According to the Federation of American Scientists, a single one of those shells carries 8,000 steel fettes, each weighing around eight grains and shaped like a small finned nail. The name did not come from the buzzing noise.
Whatever the troops believed, it came from the contract. The development work traces back to a 1957 program administered through Picatin Arsenal. And the program was called Beehive because of the way the darts were stacked inside the shell. Fired on muzzle action, the casing splits open within about 3 m of the tube, and the spin of the shell throws the darts outward in a cone.
Because the cone does not care whose uniform it hits, crews were supposed to warn everyone in front of the tube before pulling the lanyard. Accounts of the procedure describe a green star cluster fired overhead or simply a man screaming at the top of his lungs for everybody to get flat. At Bird, they fired it twice. The army’s campaign history records the result in a single clause.
The advancing infantry were shredded by hundreds of steel darts. While the artillery men were doing that, the northern sector had a separate problem. Jennings had worked out that part of his line did not know there were enemy soldiers behind them. His Medal of Honor citation, published by the Congressional Medal of Honor Society, describes him running through a fire swept area to warn those men, then pulling a group into a secondary perimeter and holding it.
Then he went back out. The citation says he led a group of volunteers well beyond friendly lines to an area where eight seriously wounded men were lying and brought them in. President Johnson put the medal around his neck at the White House in September of 1968. Jennings stayed in the army and finished as command sergeant major of the first cavalry division.
He died in 2003 and he is buried at Arlington. Two other men from Bird received the Distinguished Service Cross. One of them was Piper, the lieutenant who had fired the Beehive. Battery, second battalion, 19th artillery, the unit that owned that gun, was awarded a presidential unit citation. Illumination from a neighboring firebase, supporting artillery, aerial rocket helicopters, and armed Chinuks all reached the position, and the 22nd regiment pulled back into the dark.
The main fighting had lasted roughly an hour, and it had cost both sides more than most week-long operations in that province. If work like this is worth having on YouTube, subscribing is the thing that keeps it possible. Every figure in this video is attributed on screen to a name document, and the full source list sits in the description.
Step back from that hill for a moment. Everything you have just heard was finished inside about 60 minutes, and almost none of it is what the internet actually remembers about Landing Zone Bird. Now the part almost every retelling gets wrong. Search this battle and you will be told confidently and everywhere that bird was the first combat use of the beehive round.
The version you have heard is not the full picture. history published by the center of military history in 1975 states that the first combat firing happened on the 7th of November 1966 by a battery second battalion 320th field artillery one round nine enemy dead attack stopped that is 7 weeks before bird and Odd is not vague about it because he addresses the confusion head on.
He writes that the first firing came in November, but that it was the battle at landing zone Bird in December that really woke field artillerymen and infantrymen up to what this round could do. So, the popular claim is wrong. The reason it survives is that the truth sitting underneath it is more interesting.
There is a second story worth killing while we are here. You will hear that beehive fleshes pinned men to trees. That image turns up in veteran recollection, in marching cadence, and across the internet, and there is no documentary basis for it at Bird or anywhere else. An eight grain dart bleeds velocity extremely fast. Treated as folklore, the casualty figures need care as well.
American dead are given as 27 by Williams and as high as 30 by Aught with 67 wounded. The enemy figure, usually quoted as 266 or 267, is a MACV body count, and body counts from this war carry every reliability problem the era is famous for. The Vietnam Helicopter Pilots Association records at least 266 killed. Other accounts push it to nearly 300, and none of those figures can be independently verified today.
Even the size of the attacking force is unsettled. The center of military history describes two North Vietnamese battalions. OTT describes two companies making the silent approach. Veteran accounts put the total force at around a thousand men, and one Vietnamese American veteran who was on the perimeter that night remembered more than 2,000.
Even the identity of the defending unit is contested, which tells you something about the record. Williams in the center of military history name company C of the first battalion 12th cavalry. OTT names the second battalion. Both are official histories and they disagree. Here is what concluded and it is the line that explains why this night is remembered at all.
He wrote that the most important benefit derived from the action at Bird was recognition that the Beehive round was a tremendously valuable asset to the overall firebase defense program. That is an official Army history saying in the flattest language available that the United States Army did not properly understand a weapon it already owned until one gun crew reached for it out of desperation.
Everything afterwards flows from that. Beehive became a fixture of firebased defense. Crews trained on cranking tubes down to direct lay. Later in the war, the artillery developed low angle air burst techniques, the ones nicknamed killer junior, and those eventually replaced beehive for most situations.
Bird itself was judged indefensible. A new landing zone bird went up on higher ground several miles east and the bend in the river was abandoned. The morning after the survivors buried people. American dead went to a makeshift morg and then out on helicopters. The Vietnamese dead went into a pit cut by a bulldozer flown in that morning and roughly 60 men went into it.
56 years later that pit was found. The United States Institute of Peace has documented how a Vietnamese engineer named Ninguan Schwanthong came across an account of the battle posted online by an American veteran, illustrated with photographs taken the morning after by an 18-year-old soldier called Steve Hasset. Those photographs let Vietnamese researchers match the hillside.
In 2022, four American survivors of Bird traveled back to Jansen Hill to help locate a second grave. One of them, Kinlow, told the Association of the United States Army what that night had been. Their positions were being overrun, he said, and the guns fired beehive at pointblank range to push the attack back.
Al Jazzer reported in 2025 that the remains recovered from the first grave were reeried with honors at a martyr’s cemetery with thousands of people present. So the secret weapon was not a secret to the army and the night it became famous was not the night it was first fired. What is actually true is smaller and harder to package.
12 howitzers and a half strength company on bad ground during a ceasefire. a regiment that got within 12 meters without being heard. One gun crew that lowered a barrel into their own perimeter and made a decision, the United States Army then wrote into doctrine, Jansen Hill is planted with acacia trees.
Now, there is still a second grave somewhere underneath it. If this is the kind of history you want more of, the sources for every claim in this video are linked below, including the Army’s own artillery volume, which is free to read. Subscribe if you would like the next