The deadly AMBUSH “We Were Soldiers” didn’t show
The deadly AMBUSH “We Were Soldiers” didn’t show

What if I told you *We Were Soldiers* ends before an even bloodier battle begins? The movie leaves us at Landing Zone X-Ray. Hal Moore’s battalion has survived. The helicopters come. The dead are carried away. And the story feels finished. But it wasn’t. The very next morning, another battalion of the 7th Cavalry picked up its weapons and walked out of the same battlefield.
They thought they were heading toward helicopters that would finally take them away from the Ia Drang Valley. Instead, they walked directly toward hundreds of North Vietnamese soldiers waiting in the jungle. At X-Ray, 79 Americans had been killed. At the battle that came next, roughly 155 would die.
Most of them in only a few hours. And when the shooting started, some of the American company commanders weren’t even with their men. They had been called forward just moments before the ambush. One of the young officers suddenly left behind was 24-year-old First Lieutenant James Lawrence. A sergeant screamed at him that he was now in command.
Lawrence tried to stand. Two bullets ripped through his helmet. He survived. His best friend, fighting less than a hundred yards away, did not. This was Landing Zone Albany. The battle *We Were Soldiers* didn’t show. And the terrifying part isn’t simply that it happened. It’s that, for almost an hour before the first shot was fired, the North Vietnamese could see the Americans coming.
The Americans had almost no idea they were there. So how did a battalion that had just survived one of the most famous battles of the Vietnam War walk straight into something even worse? The answer begins where the movie ends. Landing Zone X-Ray had already become a killing ground. On November 14, 1965, helicopters carried Lieutenant Colonel Hal Moore and the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry into a small clearing beneath the Chu Pong Massif.
American forces knew North Vietnamese troops were operating somewhere in the region. What they did not initially know was how close they were to a major enemy concentration. Within hours, Moore’s battalion was fighting for survival. North Vietnamese troops attacked repeatedly. Artillery fired into the surrounding terrain.
American aircraft hammered enemy positions. Helicopter pilots flew through enemy fire to bring ammunition in and carry wounded soldiers out. Men like Bruce Crandall kept returning when landing at X-Ray had become extraordinarily dangerous. The battle lasted for days. Seventy-nine Americans were killed.
Hundreds more were wounded. But the battalion held. And that is the story most people remember. It is the battle immortalized in *We Were Soldiers*. A surrounded American battalion. A charismatic commander. Helicopters descending through fire. Men holding a perimeter against a larger force. And eventually, survival.
Cinema needs an ending. X-Ray gave it one. History didn’t. Because after Moore’s men began leaving the landing zone, other American soldiers were still there. The 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry had moved into the area to help relieve them. Some of these men had already been fighting or moving for days. They were tired.
They had slept little. And on November 17, they received another order. They were leaving X-Ray. That should have sounded like good news. A B-52 strike was planned near the Chu Pong Massif, so the American units had to clear the area. The men would move overland toward other landing zones. Helicopters would pick them up.
The fighting at X-Ray appeared to be over. The mission now sounded almost routine. Walk out. Reach the landing zone. Go home. But somewhere beyond the grass and trees, North Vietnamese soldiers were still watching the valley. And they had just learned something important about the Americans. At X-Ray, attacking an organized American perimeter from a distance had been brutally expensive.
American artillery was devastating. Air support was devastating. Helicopters could move men and ammunition astonishingly fast. If North Vietnamese troops allowed the Americans to organize, the Americans could bring an entire system of firepower down around them. So the next fight would have to be different.
The enemy would have to get closer. Much closer. Close enough that American artillery could not fire without risking American lives. Close enough that aircraft could not easily distinguish friend from enemy. Close enough that the battle would stop looking like a battlefield… and start looking like chaos.
If you enjoy discovering the part of military history that movies leave behind, subscribe to Forgotten War Stories. Because on the morning of November 17, the men of the 2nd Battalion were already walking toward exactly that kind of fight. They just didn’t know it yet. The soldiers marching away from X-Ray were not inexperienced in the usual sense.
They were trained American infantrymen. Many of their officers had gone through demanding schools. Some leaders had combat experience. But the 2nd Battalion had another weakness. It had not had much time to become one cohesive organization. The U.S. Army was rapidly building its new airmobile force. Helicopters were changing the battlefield.
Infantry could now leap over terrain that once required hours or days to cross. Artillery could be repositioned by air. Supplies could move faster. Wounded men could theoretically be extracted much more quickly. Ia Drang was supposed to demonstrate what this new kind of warfare could accomplish. But helicopters could move a battalion faster than they could create trust inside it.
Before deploying to Vietnam, the 2nd Battalion had experienced major personnel turnover. More than half of its leaders had joined relatively recently. Its commander, Lieutenant Colonel Robert McDade, had taken command only weeks before Albany. McDade was a Korean War veteran. He was not new to the Army.
But he was new to many of the men who now depended on his decisions. The same was true farther down the chain. Young officers had been promoted rapidly. Responsibilities changed quickly. And among those young officers were two men whose lives had been almost perfectly synchronized. James Lawrence and Donald Cornett.
They had been roommates during Infantry Officer Basic School. They attended jump school together. They traveled across the Pacific together. They served in the same battalion. They became platoon leaders. They were promoted to first lieutenant at the same time. Then, on the same day, both men became company executive officers.
Lawrence went to D Company. Cornett went to C Company. They were friends before Vietnam. They remained friends inside it. And on November 17, they began the march from X-Ray only a short distance apart. By sunset, one would be badly wounded. The other would be dead. But that morning, none of this was visible.
There was no warning. No dramatic intelligence report. No captured map showing an ambush. The battalion simply received an order to move. And so it moved. At approximately nine in the morning, two American battalions left the X-Ray area. The 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry and the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry initially moved together.
For a while, the route was uneventful. Then, around eleven o’clock, they separated. The 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry turned toward Landing Zone Columbus. Their march would remain uneventful. McDade’s battalion turned toward Landing Zone Albany. Albany was roughly two kilometers away. And almost immediately after the two battalions separated, a small decision removed one layer of protection.
The commander of the 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry offered McDade the artillery fire that had been walking ahead of his own men. McDade declined. There was logic behind the decision. Repeated artillery could announce the battalion’s location to enemy forces nearby. Silence might help conceal their movement.
But concealment only works when the enemy has not already found you. The Americans did not know that question had effectively been answered. Somewhere ahead of them, North Vietnamese forces remained intact. And the American column was becoming increasingly vulnerable. At the front, Captain Joel Sugdinis’ A Company moved carefully.
Reconnaissance troops were out ahead. Security was maintained. At the rear, Captain George Forrest and his attached company also remained cautious. Men watched the flanks. Artillery support was arranged. But between those two ends, the formation became looser. It was hot. The men were exhausted. The grass was tall enough to interfere with visibility and control.
The column stretched. Companies C and D occupied much of that vulnerable middle. Some soldiers later remembered the march as almost casual. A walk through the sun. That description may be the most frightening part of what happened. Because while some Americans were beginning to feel that the dangerous part of Ia Drang was behind them…
the enemy was beginning to understand exactly where they were. Think about the shape of that battalion. Hundreds of men spread along a narrow path through vegetation. The head reaching toward Albany. The rear hundreds of yards behind. The middle stretched between them. Visibility restricted. Communication difficult.
Men exhausted. And no clear knowledge that a major enemy force was nearby. If someone had drawn an ambush on a map… it might have looked very much like this. Then two North Vietnamese soldiers emerged from the jungle. And instead of revealing the trap… they helped close it. Shortly before noon, the American reconnaissance platoon captured two North Vietnamese soldiers.
They appeared exhausted. Both were suffering from malaria. They claimed to have deserted. They talked about the B-52 attacks. Nothing about them screamed immediate danger. So they were taken forward for questioning. McDade came up. Members of his staff came up. An interpreter came up. The column stopped. At first, this was simply a sensible attempt to gather intelligence.
But the questioning took time. So did bringing the necessary officers forward. Minutes accumulated. The sun remained overhead. The battalion waited. And tired soldiers did what tired soldiers do when a march unexpectedly stops. Some sat down. Some ate. Some smoked. Some rested their heads against their packs.
Some closed their eyes. For the first time in hours, men had permission to stop moving. They believed they were waiting. In reality, they were giving the enemy time. North Vietnamese commanders had now received solid information that American troops were approaching Albany. Among the enemy forces still operating in the area was the 8th Battalion of the 66th Regiment.
Its commander, Le Xuan Phoi, was ordered to attack. He did not rush. That is important. This was not an enemy force stumbling into the Americans and opening fire. Phoi had time to look at the situation. And the situation was almost ideal. The American battalion was stretched out. Much of it was stationary.
Tall vegetation concealed movement. The North Vietnamese could approach extremely close. So Phoi began building an ambush. His troops were arranged roughly in an L-shaped formation. One part positioned alongside the American column. Another blocked the area toward which the lead Americans were advancing.
Available personnel were pulled in. Not just front-line infantry. Headquarters soldiers. Support personnel. Anyone who could carry a weapon. The plan was to wait. Let the American lead elements move farther into Albany. Allow more of the column to become trapped in the killing area. Then attack almost simultaneously.
And while the North Vietnamese were positioning themselves… the Americans made one more decision. A decision that would matter enormously once the firing began. At 1:07 in the afternoon, the American reconnaissance platoon reached Landing Zone Albany. The lead soldiers moved out to secure it. McDade now had a practical problem to solve.
If helicopters were going to extract the battalion, the companies had to be organized around the landing zone. So he stopped the column again. Then he called his company commanders forward. This was not a bizarre order. Commanders needed to understand where their men were supposed to go. But look at the battlefield the Americans did not know existed.
The battalion was stretched over hundreds of yards. North Vietnamese troops were concealed nearby. And suddenly, several of the officers responsible for controlling those scattered companies began walking toward the front. Captain Forrest had to travel more than five hundred yards from the rear. The commanders of C and D Companies also moved forward.
Radio operators accompanied them. The companies stayed where they were. So in the middle of the column, young executive officers and platoon leaders were left with men who had no reason to believe their commander would be gone for long. James Lawrence was one of them. So was Donald Cornett. The distance between the hidden North Vietnamese and some of the Americans was now measured in dozens of yards.
Not hundreds. Dozens. The enemy waited. The company commanders kept moving. The American soldiers rested. And at approximately 1:15… the North Vietnamese opened fire. The first shots could almost be mistaken for an isolated contact. Then the entire landscape seemed to explode. Automatic weapons opened from the vegetation.
Mortars came down. North Vietnamese soldiers rushed from positions so close that some Americans had almost no time to shoulder their rifles before the enemy was among them. The column was hit from the side. Then from ahead. Men dropped into elephant grass that was tall enough to hide both friend and enemy.
Commands became difficult to hear. Radio traffic became confused. And almost immediately, the battalion began breaking into pieces. Captain Forrest heard the shooting and understood what had happened. His company was behind him. He turned around and ran. Two radio operators went with him. Both were killed during the dash.
Forrest made it back. The commanders of C and D Companies did not. That meant the front of the column still had senior officers. The rear regained its commander. But large parts of the middle suddenly had neither. And that is where James Lawrence was. When the shooting began, Lawrence did what almost everyone else did.
He got down. He fired. He tried to understand where the enemy was. But the battle had already become too close and too confused for conventional orientation. North Vietnamese troops were appearing through the grass. American soldiers were firing in different directions. Units lost contact with each other.
There was no clean line showing where one side ended and the other began. Lawrence was still acting like a rifleman when a sergeant shouted at him. His company commander was gone. Lawrence was the executive officer. That meant Lawrence was now in command. The words changed the battle instantly. Seconds earlier, his job was to survive.
Now his job was to make decisions for everyone around him. To do that, he had to get up. Lawrence pushed himself off the ground. A North Vietnamese soldier fired. Two rounds struck Lawrence’s helmet. Both tore through it. Neither entered his skull. The impact still hit him with enormous force. His body snapped backward.
He crashed into the ground. Then Lawrence tried to move. His legs did not respond. For a moment, he had no way of knowing that the bullets had missed his brain and spinal cord. All he knew was that he could not feel his legs. He believed he might be dying. The company around him was collapsing. And the man who had just become its senior officer could not stand.
But Lawrence could still speak. So he began directing the men around him toward the wooded area near Albany. If they could reach it, they might find other Americans. They might form a perimeter. They might survive long enough for support to find them. Someone began dragging Lawrence. Then, at one point, he was left exposed.
Unable to walk, Lawrence pulled himself forward using his arms. Another soldier eventually reached him and pulled him farther toward cover. All around him, the battalion was dissolving into small groups. And somewhere less than a hundred yards away… Don Cornett was fighting his own version of the same nightmare.
Cornett was the executive officer of C Company. Like Lawrence, his company commander had gone forward. Like Lawrence, he suddenly carried responsibility that had not been his minutes earlier. And now C Company was taking heavy fire. Cornett tried to organize his men. He was ordered to help relieve pressure on D Company.
That meant moving toward Lawrence’s position. The distance was short. Under normal conditions, less than a hundred yards would have been nothing. At Albany, it might as well have been a mile. North Vietnamese soldiers occupied the vegetation between them. Fire was coming from multiple directions. C Company tried to move.
The attempt ran into heavy resistance. Cornett was hit. He continued trying to organize the men around him. He would not survive. Lawrence had no idea. The two officers who had shared rooms, schools, promotions and the voyage to Vietnam were now fighting almost side by side… yet completely separated. And their companies were not alone.
Across the battalion, men were becoming isolated. Some found three or four soldiers from their platoon. Others found men from completely different units. Some could hear Americans nearby but had no safe way to reach them. In the tall grass, a man standing twenty yards away could disappear. A muzzle flash could appear before the shooter did.
The battlefield stopped behaving like a battlefield. There was no clear American front. No obvious North Vietnamese front. There were pockets. And that created a terrifying problem. The Americans had weapons capable of devastating the enemy. But for a critical period… they could barely use them. At X-Ray, American artillery and aircraft had been decisive.
Forward observers could identify enemy concentrations. Coordinates could be transmitted. Guns miles away could fire. Aircraft could attack. The enemy could be punished before he ever reached the perimeter. Albany was different. The North Vietnamese had gotten inside the distance where those advantages were easiest to use.
American troops and North Vietnamese troops were mixed together. Sometimes only yards apart. Colonel Thomas Brown watched parts of the battle from a helicopter above. He could locate the front. He could locate the rear. But the shattered middle of the column was far harder to define. And that meant artillery became dangerous.
A shell aimed at the enemy might land among Americans. An air strike might kill men already trapped beneath the trees. This was exactly the kind of battlefield the North Vietnamese wanted. Close enough that American technology could not immediately solve the problem. Close enough that survival came down to rifles, grenades, small groups of men…
and seconds. For the soldiers in the middle, there was another psychological blow. They could hear American aircraft. They knew artillery existed. They knew help was somewhere nearby. But they could not simply call all of it onto their own position. The enemy was too close. Before American firepower could return to the battle, the soldiers on the ground first had to accomplish something much more basic.
They had to create somewhere for that firepower to defend. And slowly… three separate American positions began to emerge. At the head of the column, the soldiers around Albany began pulling together. Captain Sugdinis. The reconnaissance platoon. McDade. Members of the battalion staff. Survivors who had reached the area.
They gathered around large termite mounds and trees. It was not a defensive position anyone had planned. It became one because the men needed something solid. Something they could recognize. Something they could defend in every direction. Within roughly half an hour, a small perimeter emerged. It was cramped.
It was vulnerable. But it existed. At the rear, Captain Forrest reached his company and began doing the same thing. He ordered his men back into a defensive position. The North Vietnamese attacked. The company held. Now the battalion had two relatively coherent islands. One near Albany. One hundreds of yards behind it.
And between them… men were still dying. The middle of the column had no real perimeter. There were simply groups of Americans scattered through the grass. Some were wounded. Some were alone. Some were trying to find their units. Some were staying motionless because any movement drew fire. Some were close enough to hear organized American positions but unable to reach them.
There was no easy way to rescue these men. A patrol entering the grass might encounter North Vietnamese troops. It might get lost. It might be fired on by Americans who could not identify who was approaching. For a time, the safest place to be was inside one of the perimeters. But the men outside them did not have that choice.
Then, more than an hour after the ambush began, American aircraft finally found something they could hit. North Vietnamese troops were beginning to concentrate around identifiable American positions. At approximately 2:15 in the afternoon, A-1E Skyraiders attacked. Cannons. Bombs. Napalm. The effect was immediate.
Enemy troops preparing to press the assault were disrupted. Artillery began striking other positions. The American firepower that had seemed almost useless during the opening chaos was finally returning. And this changed the clock. The North Vietnamese had needed to destroy the American pockets quickly.
Because every minute those pockets survived made it easier for aircraft and artillery to identify where the enemy was. The Americans did not regain control of the battlefield. But they had survived the moment when the enemy had almost complete control of it. Now the fight entered another phase. The question was no longer whether the battalion would collapse in the first attack.
It was how many of its isolated men would still be alive when help finally reached them. Albany did not suddenly become safe when aircraft arrived. The battle continued. Sniper fire. Mortars. Small attacks. Attempts to move between groups. Men crawling through vegetation. Wounded soldiers calling for help that could not always reach them.
McDade maintained communication with higher headquarters. But the battalion as an organization had largely ceased to exist. For parts of the afternoon, McDade could control the men physically around him. He could request artillery. He could request aircraft. But he could not simply issue a battalion order and expect hundreds of scattered soldiers to execute it.
Albany became a battle decided by local actions. One officer organizing twenty men. A sergeant finding ammunition. A medic refusing to leave a casualty. A platoon holding one piece of ground. A forward observer identifying a target. A pilot making another pass. There was no single heroic counterattack that suddenly reversed everything.
There was simply survival accumulating minute by minute. At approximately 6:30 that evening, helicopters arrived with reinforcements. Captain Diduryk’s B Company of the 2nd Battalion had been pulled together. Only about eighty-three effective men were available. They were flown into Albany. By then, North Vietnamese pressure around the landing zone had weakened enough for the helicopters to land.
The arrival mattered. The perimeter at Albany now had more men. More ammunition. More organization. At the rear, Forrest’s position was still holding. The North Vietnamese had failed to destroy either major American pocket. But the sun was going down. And darkness did not solve the worst problem. There were still American soldiers trapped between them.
Some could walk. Others could not. And nobody knew exactly where all of them were. The battlefield grew dark. Artillery continued falling on suspected enemy positions. For Americans still outside the organized perimeters, some of those rounds landed terrifyingly close. Small groups remained scattered through the battlefield.
Some men had been wounded hours earlier. Others were protecting casualties who could no longer move. A patrol from the rear eventually found a group of roughly twenty wounded Americans. Several of the most serious casualties were carried back. Those who could still walk followed. But not everyone could be moved.
A medic remained with the men who had to stay. At the Albany perimeter, there were discussions about sending men deeper into the battlefield. The urge was obvious. American soldiers were lying out there. Some might still be alive. But darkness made every problem worse. A patrol could lose direction. It could walk directly into enemy soldiers.
And isolated Americans might fire on it before realizing who was approaching. So the decision was made to wait for daylight. For the wounded men outside the perimeter, that meant surviving the night largely on their own. James Lawrence was among the casualties. He still did not know whether he would ever walk again.
The bullets had missed his head. But the violent impact had bruised his spinal cord. His legs remained largely useless. And somewhere nearby, Don Cornett was dead. Lawrence did not know that either. Through the darkness, North Vietnamese units began withdrawing. They had inflicted enormous damage. But they had failed to destroy the American positions.
By morning, the battlefield finally became accessible. Soldiers began searching the grass. They found wounded men. They found equipment. They found enemy dead. And everywhere… they found Americans. Lawrence was evacuated. Doctors initially feared his spinal injury could be permanent. Gradually, sensation and movement returned.
He would recover. He would eventually return to duty in Vietnam. But the battalion he returned to would never look the same. The numbers from Albany are still difficult to absorb. Roughly four hundred American soldiers were involved around the main battle area. About 155 were killed. Another 124 were wounded.
In only a matter of hours, a massive portion of the force had become casualties. C Company was nearly annihilated. Entire groups of men had been wiped out or scattered. At X-Ray, the battle everyone remembers from *We Were Soldiers*, 79 Americans had been killed. Albany cost almost twice that number. And the majority of the killing occurred during roughly six hours.
North Vietnamese forces also suffered badly. American estimates of enemy casualties varied, sometimes dramatically. Some early body counts were very high. Later accounts questioned those figures. Even American officers who had been there disputed some of the larger claims. That uncertainty matters. Because Albany does not need exaggerated numbers to be horrifying.
The American losses alone tell us what happened. The battalion marched toward a landing zone. Hours later, more than half the force had been killed or wounded. And yet Albany never entered American popular memory the way X-Ray did. That was not simply because Hollywood ignored it. The process had started long before the movie existed.
X-Ray fit the emerging American story of airmobile warfare. Helicopters had delivered a battalion into difficult terrain. Air power had supported it. Artillery had devastated enemy attacks. The Americans had survived. There were lessons the Army wanted to understand and capabilities it wanted to demonstrate.
Albany was more uncomfortable. The same war. The same division. The same valley. But a very different lesson. Air mobility could move soldiers rapidly into dangerous places. It could not guarantee that they would know where the enemy was. Artillery could deliver overwhelming fire. It could not help when friend and enemy were mixed together.
Air power could be devastating. It could not automatically save a unit already fragmented on the ground. And trained soldiers could still be caught in an ambush if fatigue, terrain, command decisions and a capable enemy lined up at exactly the wrong moment. Albany did not disprove the lessons of X-Ray.
It completed them. And that is precisely why leaving Albany out changes the story of Ia Drang. For James Lawrence, the meaning of Albany did not arrive as a casualty statistic. It arrived on paper. He was recovering in the hospital. His legs were functioning again. He had survived two bullets through his helmet.
He had survived the ambush. He had survived being dragged across the battlefield. Then, roughly two weeks after Albany, Lawrence was reading *Stars and Stripes*. The newspaper contained casualty names. Lawrence had a red pen. He began reading. He recognized one name. He marked it. Then another. Another. Another.
By the time he finished, Lawrence had marked sixty-five names of men he personally knew. Sixty-five. That was when the scale of the battle finally hit him. Among those names was Don Cornett. His roommate. His friend. The officer who had trained beside him. Jumped beside him. Crossed the Pacific beside him.
Received the same promotion. And gone into the same battle. Cornett had died less than a hundred yards away. Lawrence had survived. For decades afterward, Lawrence spoke about Albany. But not as a simple victory story. His point was not that the Americans at Albany had failed. And it was not that they lacked courage.
Quite the opposite. Albany contains countless examples of courage. But Lawrence understood something that a clean war story can easily hide. Courage does not make a battlefield fair. It does not erase exhaustion. It does not fix broken communication. It does not guarantee that the right officer will be standing in the right place when the shooting starts.
And it cannot make every friend come home. Sometimes courage is simply what remains after everything else has gone wrong. The title *We Were Soldiers* creates an interesting problem. Because the movie was based on the book written by Hal Moore and Joe Galloway. And the book does tell the story of Albany.
So this is not a story that Moore and Galloway tried to erase. The movie made a narrative choice. It focused overwhelmingly on Moore and Landing Zone X-Ray. From a filmmaking perspective, the reason is easy to understand. X-Ray has a central protagonist. A clearly defined battlefield. Repeated attacks. Helicopters coming and going.
A perimeter. A climax. An ending. Albany is messier. Its central event is fragmentation. Its senior commanders become separated from parts of their units. The battlefield breaks apart. Its heroes are scattered. Its climax is not one charge or one decision. It is hundreds of men trying to survive the consequences of surprise.
That makes Albany harder to package into a conventional war movie. But it also makes it essential to understanding the real battle. X-Ray demonstrated what American air mobility could do when a battalion established a defensive position and connected itself to artillery, aircraft and helicopters. Albany demonstrated what could happen before that system was able to function.
At X-Ray, the enemy came to the American perimeter. At Albany, the Americans walked alongside the enemy before they even knew the fight had begun. At X-Ray, artillery could hammer enemy formations. At Albany, the enemy closed the distance until artillery initially became dangerous to both sides. At X-Ray, the battalion remained a battalion.
At Albany, within minutes, it became islands of men fighting separate wars. And that is why the two battles belong together. One without the other gives an incomplete picture. If you only know X-Ray, Ia Drang can look like a demonstration of what American firepower and leadership could overcome. Albany adds the warning.
The same soldiers. The same weapons. The same helicopters. The same support system. And an entirely different outcome when the enemy achieved surprise. The most haunting part is how little separated those realities. Not weeks. Not months. Not another campaign. One day. The movie ends. The surviving soldiers walk away.
And if history were a film, that would be where the credits begin. But on November 17, 1965, there were no credits. Another battalion picked up its rifles. They left Landing Zone X-Ray. They started walking through the grass. And somewhere ahead… the battle *We Were Soldiers* didn’t show was already waiting for them.