Why the Wehrmacht Lost Momentum for the First Time at Smolensk in 1941 – A Documentary Analysis

In summers seemed the German advance in the east a fixed, almost mechanical pattern to follow. Deep armor wedges broke through the enemy front. Motorized units pushed far in the depth of the room in front and closed entire armies in cauldrons while the advancing infantry destruction sealed. This Interplay of movement, speed and Extermination had occurred in Poland and in Western Europe works and in the first weeks of the campaign against the Soviet Union seemed to be repeat.

 Exactly at this point our consideration begins because at Smolensk began this tried and tested pattern to crumble for the first time and not because of a single error, but through the coming together of several forces at the same time. This analysis follows several lines at the same time. She looks at the tactics of the deep armor penetrations and formation big cauldron, the decisions of the Commander of the tank groups and the High command of the Wehrmacht training and the condition of the motorized associations as well as the logistical limits on one

huge theater of war. She also advances the ability of the red ones Army in sight, new ones in a short time To bring in armies and trapped ones To use forces specifically to achieve this to disrupt German tempo. Only in Interaction of these factors will understandable, why of all people this place and these weeks Movement stalled, the previously had seemingly been unstoppable.

 The The frame results from the course of the first weeks. With the beginning of the Company Barbarossa occurred on June 22nd the Heres group in the middle to attack and quickly achieved deep breakthroughs in the Soviet defense. Already around that July 10th she had the line of western Duner and the Denjiper achieved.

 West of these rivers were the main forces of the Soviet Western front in several pockets been smashed, including in large double boiler from Bialistok and Minsk. From a German perspective it seemed Collapse of the Red Army imminent and the Leadership expected that decisive blow against Moscow to be able to lead in a short time, even before autumn and those associated with it Difficulties began.

 But those The following two months marked a different picture. The Battle of Smolensk, which takes place from July 10th to the 10th. September dragged on became the moment in which the blitzkrieg among the Conditions of the Eastern Front for the first time ceased to be a continuous system work. From one uninterrupted flow of breakthrough, Enclosure and destruction became one Sequence of individual advances interrupted of long breaks in which the Associations first had to recover.

The timing of this is remarkable change. It didn’t just happen Moscow in late autumn. but already in Midsummer, weeks before the actual one Battle for the capital began. It It’s not about judgments about size or failure, but about the sober Ask which factors interacted and at exactly what point this was tested Model reached its limits.

 This one The question first takes us to the rivers Düer and the Jeppe, where the the first cracks in the tempo became visible. After the fall of Minsk, they continued both tank groups of the Heres Group middle of their advance with high Speed continues. The second Panzer group under Heinz Guderian pushed east towards the Dener, while the third tank group under Hermann Hot further north the diesel.

On July 1st, Hot Witsk took one important junction that leads the way to Northeast opened. Just a day or two later, on July 10 and 11, forced Guderian the crossing over the Dineper, south and north of Mugilev. With that was one of the last major river lines overcome before Smolensk and the Tank formations appeared to be standing freely open space, ready for the next one Jump east.

 The pace of this Advances were considerable. The motorized tips placed underneath favorable conditions up to 90 or 100 km per day. Reached on July 15th the 7th Panzer Division surrounded the area Yartsevo east of Smolensk and cut thus one of the most important streets and Train connections towards Moscow. On the map, this looked like the beginning another exemplary boiler.

But behind this movement opened up a dangerous gap. The Infantry armies that support the success of the Secure tanks and the mass of the Prisoners were supposed to cope, followed only about 30 km a day. Between the fast tank tips and the the advancing infantry gaped Distance that grew day by day and the front-line associations are increasingly on the rise stood alone.

 For the two of them This preliminary breach was not a tank leader coincidence, but rather an expression of a conscious one Mindset. Guderian was considered an advocate of the principle once won To maintain momentum at all costs and the defeated opponent has no time to allow recovery. Hot shared this Understanding at the core and driving forces as well far forward.

 Both acted in that Trust that speed itself become a weapon because it attacks the opponent Force decisions for which he is responsible There is no time. This attitude had in the previous campaigns were brilliant brought results. But it was based on a tacit one Prerequisite, namely that the space remains manageable and the supplies could follow the advance.

 In the room around Smolensk began this requirement to falter for the first time, the boldness of the Leadership went into a growing one contradiction to the actual ones Possibilities of your own troops. This one Distance would not be fundamental Problem was when the German The assumption would have been correct that the Main forces of the Red Army already destroyed west of the rivers be.

 It was precisely this assumption that shaped it Leadership thinking. It was assumed that beyond Düner and Den Jäpper only scattered remains are to be expected be those in pursuit could wear down. Instead they hit Tank tops on the east bank for freshness Armies that represented the Soviet leadership the depth of the land and had repositioned. What as Pursuit of a defeated opponent was planned, turned into a Wrestling with an enemy that is constantly changing threw forces into the balance.

 That was it the first prerequisite of rapid Success already questioned, still before the actual boiler is closed was. These fresh armies emerged not by chance, but by one conscious decision by the Soviets Leadership. While the remains of the shattered Western Front still went back, were from inside the New associations were introduced and incorporated into the country second line behind Düer and the Jepper set up.

 your education and Equipment was often inadequate. Many Units were without sufficient Experience and with scarce equipment in the Battle thrown. But her mere Presence changed the equation basic. Where the German leadership with expected to be in a swept-empty room, were now standing Troops that are individually inferior may be, but in their entirety always put up new resistance.

 For the attacker this meant that everyone breakthrough did not lead to teaching, but on a new line of defense pushed. The depth of the space and the readiness of the Soviet leadership entire armies as a price for time to use, became one Factor that no one no matter how bold could overcome the tank advance alone.

In this situation the formation of the Smolensk cauldron. The goal existed in it, the Soviet 16th, 19th and 20th. to enclose the army in the area of the city. The 29th was pushing from the south. motorized division. From the north the 7th Panzer Division tried that close the ring. Both associations should join hands east of the city range and so those included Forces from their supplies and Cut off escape routes.

 On the The cauldron soon appeared on maps closed. But the reality on Floor looked different because the existing forces were not enough to completely block the wide spaces. The ring stayed for days permeable. It wasn’t until July 22nd that it was possible complete control of Smolensk itself and the boiler remained until about July 26th and 27th at several locations open.

 The final cleansing of the enclosed space extended into the first days of August, approximately until August 5th. Used during this period significant parts of the 19th and 20th armies a narrow corridor near Solovo over the Denj to the east to discontinue. In the end, the German one counted Page until the beginning of August about 300 to 350 000 prisoners, a huge number to a great operational success indicated.

 And yet it was a significant one Part of the trapped troops escaped and stood again shortly afterwards in the front. The fights inside Kessels had a character that stood out clear from the rapid breakthroughs from the previous weeks. The trapped Soviet armies did not surrender, but tried repeatedly closed shocks against to lead the thin German bars, mostly in the direction of the one who saves corridor to the east.

 This one Attempts to break out often occurred Night, concentrated in narrow sections and met motorized ones there Associations that barely had enough strength to secure the entire length of the ring. Wherever the German bar gave way, people streamed Parts of the trapped troops through, gathered beyond Diniper and kicked again a little later to fight.

 For the Germans This meant one division grueling small war in which the Fronts moved several times a day and by reducing the consumption of people, Ammunition and nerves were far beyond what what a clean, quickly closed one boiler would have cost. The reason for this incomplete destruction lay in the structure of the battle.

 The Germans Panzer divisions had two tasks cope at the same time. had to the outside they formed a front against those from the east approaching Soviet relief forces to keep. They had to go inside Attempts to break out by those trapped Repel armies. The infantry, the would have taken on this dual task was still a long way off.

 So The paradoxical situation arose highly mobile armored units as standing cordon troops were tied up, while their real strength is the Advance into the depths was unused. Here an obvious question arises. Why led to the rapid capture of the city Smolensk not for immediate Destruction of the forces within boiler? The answer lies in that this disproportion between the Speed of the tanks and the Slowness of the following Infantry that held the cauldron for weeks kept unstable and permeable.

 While these battles were ongoing, it became apparent first signs of something deeper Exhaustion, no longer alone explain with the resistance of the opponent let. Already in the middle of July sensed the tanks and motorized Divisions face a growing shortage Fuel, ammunition and spare parts. The long distances between the…

Front tips and the back Supply bases lay, made everyone Subsequent delivery to a lengthy one Company. Tanks passing through Damage caused by combat or simply by the Long-term stress could often fail not repaired in time because the necessary parts were missing or only over hundreds of kilometers had to be brought in.

 From one Advantage in mobility became like this gradually becoming dependent on one Supply that no longer step held. The consequences quickly became apparent the numbers. Around July 20th the Combat strength of many armored divisions in the middle of the Heres group only to about 50% of the initial value estimated. [snort] That means that a large part of the tanks with which the campaign had begun, either destroyed, damaged or due to not operational due to technical failures was.

 These associations kept the pace so no longer at full strength, but increasingly out of substance out by taking the remaining ones operational vehicles about each beyond reasonable limits. Each further advance reduced the number the reserve from which the next Movement could be fed. Besides Because of the material, people also suffered. Crews have had since June 22nd fought almost without rest, often at oppressive summer heat and in the constant Dust of unpaved roads.

Experienced drivers, gunners and Commanders in the pre-war years who had been painstakingly trained, fell and did not leave quickly replace. Every loss of one well-rehearsed crew member reduced the combat power of one Unity is stronger than mere number suggested because of the interaction Board a tank on exercise and Trust is based.

 Also the vehicles themselves showed the traces of the Permanent load. Engines, transmissions and Drives were over for long marches rough slopes not designed and many Failures were not due to enemy action back. but simply due to wear and tear. The front units drove like this With the handbrake on, so to speak further, slowed down by your own wear and tear.

 This made sense fundamental connection. The high one The pace of the July 1st half was not Expression of a healthy, sustainable system, but the result of one extreme overload of the front ones Associations. As long as these associations brought forward, the movement stopped. Yes the supply system in the back came already stalled and was able to Consumption of fuel, ammunition and Material can no longer be balanced.

 The crucial question shifted thus from the inside of the boiler outside. What happened on the outside? Edges, where the fresh ones are Soviet armies against the thin ran into the German barrier? Exactly at these edges should be in the the following weeks decide whether from the temporary stagnation becomes permanent break would be, and right there now the focus is on.

 To the outer edges of the bowl something happened in the last days of July that the German leadership doesn’t do that had expected. Instead of an expiring one Resistance of beaten remains the red army deployed a number of Counterattacks from day to day gained force. Under the overall management from Marshall Tymoshenko initially five, a little later seven, newly set up Armies against the German barrier fronts thrown, including the 24th and 28th.

the 29th and 30th armies. This one Associations were only in the weeks before been compiled, often from Reservists and incomplete equipped units. Still kicked not isolated on them, but in a continuous chain of shocks, hardly any of the German bars allowed breathing space. The attacks started from July 21st from the east and in a northeasterly direction and set up against the sparsely occupied External fronts of the tank groups.

Things developed particularly bitterly the battles for Jelnia, one Front line southeast of Smolensk, which soon became a symbol of this new species of the war. At the same time tried General Rokosowski with gathered forces a corridor to the to open up trapped armies and a path to the east is open to them hold.

 These advances cost the red Army huge losses because they were often without sufficient Preparation, without enough artillery and against someone who is tactically superior led opponents. But their impact was measured not the immediate one Gain of terrain, but rather on the binding German forces that arose as a result. That was exactly the point these operations.

 By the encircled troops continued to fight and constantly new attacks from outside were conducted, the boilers seemed like Anchors supporting the German advance held on. The armored divisions actually should have pushed on, stayed tied in place because them on several sides at the same time were claimed.

 The Soviet one Leadership used this method consciously a. She took her own heavy losses in order to gain time and that To deprive opponents of the opportunity movable associations to a new one to collect closed field. What on on the German side as a quick clean-up was planned, became one ongoing front of active defense, where the attack power of the Heres group in the middle consumed day after day.

The difference in scales occurs clearly evident here. The German one Planning had to do with the destruction of Leftovers expected, with a transition of the battle for pursuit. Actually she faced non-stop fighting opposite, in which the opponent always brought in new divisions again, as soon as the old ones were wiped out.

 For the troops at the front this meant, that there was no longer a clear dividing line between the breaking of the cauldron and repelling relief attacks. both merged into one Ten rings that the initiative of Attacker dissolved piecemeal, without that a single setback the would have been the cause.

 For the German one Page lay in this seemingly endless Follow new armies the actual Surprise. You had the red army counted, their divisions on the border captured and their destruction as that End of resistance understood. Yes there was one behind the first season second and behind this a third, fed by the mobilization of one huge country.

Even if one of these reserve armies is in was wiped out in a few days a new one would soon take its place they are also less educated and be weaker armed. This There was no refilling from the depths sign of tactical strength, but one strategic medium-sized property. It turned time itself into one Weapon, because every week, the German Lost advance, the Soviet took advantage Leadership to other associations to set up and introduce.

 The calculation of the quick victory on destroying the opponent before this depth could be effective. At Smolensk began this depth for the first time To be felt noticeably. About this Resistance from the opponent occurred a second time Factor that is less visible, however was more deeply effective, namely that Logistics.

 The theater of war in the East placed demands on supplies, which differ fundamentally from experience different from earlier campaigns. The A few paved roads were sufficient huge traffic not and the far Most of the advance was over unpaved country roads. When dry Weather these paths turned into Dust tracks, the engines and filters added.

 After every heavy rain however, they became mud bands, in where vehicles sank and entire ones Columns came to a halt. The Replenishment, which is already a long way had to cover, was thereby unpredictable and kept getting lost stalled. The question became more difficult added to the railway. The Soviet ones Tracks had a different gauge than the Central European ones, so that the German trains are not readily available could drive them.

 About the supplies had to be brought in by rail the conquered routes were difficult to conquer your own track width has to be nailed down. A work that consumed time and with the rapid advance of the tank leaders never kept up. This is how one was created growing gap between the place, up to to which the railways bring supplies could and the place where he needed became.

 This gap had to go through Trucks are bridged, theirs Number was limited and the themselves fuel they used should actually bring forward. The fleet also fills this gap was supposed to close, suffered from that Continuous use. The trucks were driving About the same day and night soft or rock-hard slopes, who already wore out the tanks had.

 Tires, axles and engines were available in large numbers there and there the Germans Associations of vehicles of various types origin and design, the supply of spare parts was stopped just a mess. There was a broken down truck not just a lost one means of transport, but also one Load that didn’t arrive. That’s how it was destroyed Supply to yourself, because a growing part of the fuel and the All my energy went into the task Supply routes are even operational hold.

 What in numbers like a simple What looked like a lack was actually a lack self-reinforcing cycle in which every effort new efforts required and the actual Front supplies became increasingly scarce. At the same time the distance increased between the moving tips and the following foot troops continue. The Infantry armies were limping Panzer groups were 90 to 100 km behind and this residue was eliminated pure marching performance no longer catch up.

 Meant for supplies this, that he not only has the tanks, but also the far dispersed mass of infantry had to be supplied via one Path network that does not meet the demands had grown. The fuel became scarcest of all goods. Already in the In mid-July, individuals had to advance chorus restrict their movements. Not because the enemy stopped them but simply because of the petrol was missing to fit the existing vehicles in to keep moving.

 From these constraints created a new pattern of warfare, that the reports of those weeks are clear let it be recognized. From now on she could Wehrmacht no longer attacks carry continuous current, but only still pushing. A push became so long driven, such as fuel and ammunition were enough. Then there had to be a pause, in which the supplies are replenished and the Vehicles were repaired before the next push was possible.

 This jerky approach stood in the abrupt Contrary to what the Blitzkrieg had previously identified. In Western Europe they had short ones Distances and density good developed infrastructure allows momentum without major interruptions hold. They collided in the east Methods on a space in which the In principle, there is no need to keep up with the pace could follow, and this room proved himself as an opponent who cannot prevail boldness alone could be conquered.

 With that the German leadership was faced with one Contradiction that is at the core of their own recipe for success. The Blitzkrieg was alive of the speed, but precisely that Speed drives over the border, up to theirs Supply was enough. The further the tanks advanced, the longer they became Supply routes and the longer these routes became, the rarer it was Keep pace.

 So the advance undermined the premises of his own success. What in a small room had been a strength, became widespread Space of the East to a trap into which the movable associations themselves moved in. The consequences of this double burden changed by opponents and distance now also the tactical character of the Fights.

 The armored divisions responsible for the deep thrust were created more and more in the role of defender again. Instead of in depth To encounter them, they had to be hostile Intercept attacks, lost ground regain and local counterattacks lead to a breakthrough by the opponent to prevent. This change was not conscious decision, but that result of circumstances.

 Where your own Movement weakened and the opponent relentlessly ranked, nothing was left for the mobile units other than to adapt to the new situation adapt and their strength in defense to use up instead of using them in advance unfold. What is remarkable is that the German troops use their tactics Championship by no means lost.

 On the They worked at the level of the individual battle tried and tested principles. The order tactics, that style of leadership that the lower Leaders great freedom in choosing Means left as long as they achieved the goal achieved, also proved its worth in the Defense and enabled rapid independent decisions at the front.

Likewise, the idea remained The focus is alive, the bundling of the Forces at the crucial point to be locally superior there. Wherever there was an immediate collision, The German side mostly kept it Upper hand, led clever counterattacks and inflicted heavy losses on the attacker to.

 But this tactical priority no longer translated into operational Success. At the level of the individual You wanted to win in battle. On the The level of the great movement stood front. The crucial size of the Blitzkrieg, the sustained pace over wide spaces, let yourself be carried along tactical superiority alone is not enough produce more.

 A battle won no longer created a breakthrough because none There was fuel for exploitation, because the next enemy army was already ready and because their own Bandages were too emaciated to have one To bring success to the depths. gaped a growing distance between what the troops performed in individual battles and what leadership does on a large scale wanted to achieve.

 In this one Disproportion lies at the core of the Smolensk experience. The German one Advance was not a lost cause Battle failed because the individual Battles mostly went in favor of the Wehrmacht. He was at a sum of Conditions that no individual Decision could have been reversed. On ten resistance of those trapped Troops, always new on the chain Counterattacks, on the border of their own Supply and the exhaustion of the movable associations.

 Each of these Factors in themselves would have to be overcome been. However, in their connection they formed a barrier against which not even the boldest leadership anymore arrived. Up to this point it was about an interplay of enemy action and logistical constraints, i.e. forces, those from the nature of the campaign itself grown up.

 But now came in to them another completely different factor added, which does not include the resulting break only explained, but enshrined. They were the decisions of the highest Leadership, the instructions from the Führer headquarters and the dispute about where the main force of the campaign should be directed. First in cooperation with these strategic soft positions from the temporary stagnation at the Front a permanent loss of pace and this last step is now important to take a closer look.

 While the Troops at the front with counterattacks and a shortage of supplies, fell in Führer headquarters made a decision the further course of the campaign should have a greater impact than any one individual combat. With instruction number dated 19. July and subsequent additions the top leadership shifted the Focus of the attack away from Moscow and towards the wings.

 A part of the moving forces should move north pivot to the advance on Leningrad to support, another to the south towards Ukraine and the economically important areas around Kiev. The capital itself, that nearest big target occurred for now into the background. For the Heres group Middle, which is still on the shortest Way there had stood meant this is a fundamental reversal of the previous direction.

This instruction struck a chord with the leaders men at the front on decided contradiction. The commander in chief of the Heresgruppe Mitte, field marshal of Bock, as did the tank leaders Guderian and Hot, pushed for it momentum once gained does not increase give away and without delay to Moscow to advance. From their point of view, the heart of the…

enemy resistance exactly them, and any diversion of forces had to give the enemy time to close collect. The top leadership, on the other hand stuck to her intention. With instruction number 34 of July 30th and the subsequent commands the regrouping confirmed. On the 31st In July the Heres group opened in the middle their main direction actually takes over the order to go on defense while Parts of the tank groups for the tasks were pulled out by the wings.

 It would be too easy, just this decision interpreted as an error. From one She certainly had her own particular point of view own consistency. Who the aim of the campaign is primarily in the destruction of the enemy Armed forces and in taking possession the economic foundations of the Opponent saw that the turn was closed the wings are not a detour, but one logical step.

In the south the grain, coal and industrial areas of Ukraine as well as the Prospect, large Soviet forces around to include Kiev. It worked in the north around Leningrad as the cradle of armaments and the fleet. The contradiction arose only when you can’t reach the goal the area, but rather in time. Because every deflection of the moving Associations went well for one person, that was crucial for the Blitzkrieg, namely the uninterrupted pace the shortest route to the decisive one Period. So reason didn’t stand in the way

Unreasonable, but a way of thinking against the other, and the decision In favor of the wings, the advance was stopped Moscow has been on the ground for weeks feet away. It was particularly momentous the intention to part of the tank forces turn south to get one near Kiev massive Soviet encirclement to enable troops.

 At first This panning view promised one of the greatest cauldron successes of the entire war and actually it should be a few weeks later an enormous number of prisoners bring in. But every tank, every one motorized division responsible for this Company rolled south was missing on the axis to the east. The time that If you won before Kiev, you lost before Moscow and the question of whether this exchange was the right choice, it should Assessment of the campaign in the long term accompany.

 For the course of the Events near Smolensk is crucial that the central Direction through this decision for Weeks of their sharpest tool was robbed, just at the moment in which the opponent is most vulnerable seemed to be new and at the same time the fastest brought forces. Regardless, how to evaluate this choice, she had an immediate consequence that deals with the situation of the troops.

 The moving formations were needed anyway a breathing space to be operational again to become. Their fighting strength was ready sunk that it takes a lot of effort to get it up about 60 to 70% of the target value had to be brought back before moving on to new big ones tasks to think about. Vehicles had to be repaired, losses occurred People balanced, fuel and Ammunition must be brought in.

 This one Restoration was not possible cope with it in just a few days, but rather required a period of about two Weeks in which the tank groups for the big advance was practically canceled. The strategic decision and the The troops were exhausted here the same direction and reinforced each other.

 The break that comes out of necessity was born was through the instructions made official from above, so to speak. The standstill also had an effect on the troop itself, which is in no statistics could be recorded. For weeks the advance had a develops its own pulling power in which everyone kilometers gained to the next person seemed to promise and the impression of an unstoppable victory efforts.

 Than this movement now faded and this took its place Holding positions, defending against Attacks and waiting for supplies something changed in his nature campaign. The certainty of the goal getting closer every day gave way Experience on the spot to stay stuck while the opponent is stronger became. This change in expectation wasn’t a breakdown, but he was marked the end of one self-evident, with which you can meet any resistance beforehand had temporarily held.

 For those Soviet side was one at this time Priceless gift. While the German associations gathered and refreshed, the Red Army used every day to their positions expand, bring in new troops and the defense in depth glisten. What time the attacker has lost, the defender won Resilience. Exactly this exchange of time for It was strength that the Soviet Leadership with its lossy ones had forced counterattacks and the strategic regrouping of the enemy extended the postponement even further.

The ground in front of Moscow at the end of July had almost thought free, filled up these weeks with new divisions and deep defensive lines. One place consolidated this development as if under a magnifying glass, namely that Front ledge from Jelnia. What’s there in the August happened with the Blitzkrieg nothing in common in the first few weeks.

 On the rapid breakthrough took place a tough battle for position over a few Kilometers of terrain with artillery duels, repeated attacks and likewise repeated counterattacks. The Heresgruppe Mitte was here in a way drawn into the war, theirs to go against one’s own strengths and the consuming their substance day by day, without a decisive success in sight came.

 At the end, beginning of September, gave the German leadership the lead even price and took the front back, to save energy. For the red army was the recapture of Jelenia on the 6th. September is the first visible evidence for the German advance not was no longer unstoppable. For the Wehrmacht it was the admission that too Not everyone has tactical skills could hold the position if forces and Time was missing.

 This allows the Mechanism that leads to loss of pace led, in its entirety overview. Four forces worked together and none of them alone would have the effect achieved. that they have in their connection unfolded. First there was that stubborn resistance of the trapped troops, the movable bandages tied and the boiler stayed open for weeks.

 Then that came Chain of counterattacks by fresh armies, which gives the attacker no peace to gather let. In addition, there was the logistical limit, beyond which the supplies, dem could no longer follow the advance and Finally the strategic one fell into place Redirection of the forces that the The resulting break was sealed and turned into one permanent shift of center of gravity transferred.

Only the interaction of these four Forces made from a local Delay fundamental change in the character of the entire campaign. Before This background makes it clear that Smolenske no inconsequential It was a stopover, not just a halt between two advances. was the first Point at which the entire model, the to a rapid collapse of the opponent built, on one of his load-bearing conditions failed.

 This model set out to defeat the enemy, before its depth took effect and the Deciding war before space, weather and exhaustion took their toll. At Smolensk it became apparent for the first time that exactly this requirement on the central theater of war no longer wore. The opponent did not collapse, the depth became effective and the time started working for the defense attorney.

Sobriety is required because… this finding does not contain any judgment Victory or defeat in the traditional way senses. From a purely operational perspective, it won the Wehrmacht made a big one near Smolensk Success. They closed down several Soviet ones armies, added the heaviest to them Losses increased, an important city took and pushed the front far over the Dener out to the east.

 According to the standards This would be the case in previous campaigns been a brilliant result. And yet associated with this success Loss that is not on the map was visible. The ability to a uninterrupted attack speed Keeping wide spaces away was just fine lost these weeks. The price of the operational victory was the loss of those Property that the blitzkrieg had made it what it was in the first place he was.

 The battle for Smolensk was thus to the first case, in which the German actions in the East at that pace lost that the success of the the previous weeks. The operating profit was significant and was beyond question. But the price this result and the circumstances, under whom it was achieved, changed the character of the whole thing campaign in a way that neither in captured numbers nor in conquered ones expressed in square kilometers.

The relentless Soviet ones Counter-strikes, the toughness of the trapped troops, the outermost Expansion of the supply routes and the Need for long breaks Restoration of tank formations turned the Blitzkrieg out of one continuous process into a sequence individual spurts. The strategic ones Decisions that play a large part who directed forces to the wings, wrote this break.

 At the beginning In September the Heres group decreed Middle no longer has that freedom Movement and that impact force with which she had gone into July. This However, nothing changed in terms of tactics Strengths of the German troops and did not mean that the red army too already the initiative at this point had taken over.

 But it meant that the original premise of the company, the rapid break-up of the enemy’s main forces before Arrival of deep reserves and before Beginning of autumn on the central direction no longer applied. The others Events of that autumn and winter were already under development Conditions that are changing for the first time right here in the Smolensk area had signed. M.